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Abstract
Unexpected negative health shocks of a parent may reduce adult children’s la-
bour supply via informal caregiving and stress-induced mental health problems.
We link administrative data on labour market outcomes, hospitalisations and
family relations for the full Dutch working age population for the years 1999-
2008 to evaluate the effect of an unexpected parental hospitalisation on the
probability of employment and on conditional earnings. Using an event study
difference-in-differences model combined with coarsened exact matching and in-
dividual fixed effects, we find no effect of an unexpected parental hospitalisation
on either employment or earnings for Dutch men and women, and neither for
the full population nor for the subpopulations most likely to become caregivers.
These findings suggest that the extensive public coverage of formal long-term
care in the Netherlands combined with widespread acceptance of part-time work
provides sufficient opportunities to deal with adverse health events of family
members without having to compromise one’s labour supply.
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1. Introduction
Severe adverse health events occur frequently in old age. These health shocks
do not only affect the patient, but also family members, such as adult children.
If an elderly woman falls and breaks her hip, her son may spend time sup-
porting her at home after she has returned from the hospital. In addition, the5
son probably worries about his mother and may be stressed due to the caring
responsibilities. Both time spent caring and stress may affect the son’s labour
market activities. Against this background, this study assesses how an unexpec-
ted parental hospitalisation affects labour market outcomes of adult children.
Labour market effects of parental health shocks are undesirable because they10
cause uncertainty for individuals with regard to their income that they cannot
insure themselves against. Moreover, parental health shocks may have long-term
financial consequences that the caregiver may not be aware of when deciding
about giving up his job or reducing work time to be able to care: (i) the need for
informal care often lasts a few years and re-entering the job market thereafter15
may be hard, especially for the stereotypical female, middle-aged caregiver and
(ii) reducing labour market activity (even if temporary) or quitting one’s job
altogether may have negative consequences for old-age pension benefits. Finally,
the reduction of tax and pension contributions due to caregiving can jeopardise
public finances in a context of population aging. Assessing the effects of a20
parental health shock on labour market outcomes is thus important to both
understand the trade-off that the family members face and to gain insights
for long-term care (LTC) and labour market policy. Specifically, the Dutch
government aims to increase in both labour market participation and informal
caregiving, two goals which may not be easy to reconcile (Josten and De Boer,25
2015). Indeed, if labour market participation is lower following a parental health
shock, then steps taken towards achieving one goal may put the other one further
out of reach. Policy makers may then prefer to create an environment that
facilitates combining caregiving and paid work, or lower their expectations.
Addressing this question for the Netherlands is of interest, as it is the country30
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with the highest LTC expenditure per capita in the OECD (OECD, 2017b). The
Dutch LTC system is universal, comprehensive, and very generous (Bakx et al.,
2015b). Combined with many opportunities to work part-time, this generosity
means that if workers are able to combine caregiving and work anywhere, it
would be in the Netherlands. Insights from studies about the Netherlands should35
be informative for other countries considering to extend the coverage provided
by their LTC systems.
Simply regressing children’s labour market outcomes on parental health out-
comes will lead to biased estimates for two reasons. First, if parental health is
gradually deteriorating, e.g. because of chronic illnesses such as dementia or40
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), individuals may have anticip-
ated the care needs of their parent(s), and have adjusted their labour market
status already before the health deterioration warrants LTC. In order to avoid
such anticipation bias, we exploit diagnoses from unexpected hospitalisations
classified by physician expert opinion as plausibly exogenous variation in par-45
ental health. While these hospitalisations represent a subset of all health prob-
lems that the elderly experience, they represent a large and relevant subset.
Second, we can rule out that the parental health shock indicator suffers from
justification bias that may be common in survey data, since it is not self-reported
but based on hospital admission diagnoses from administrative data.50
Using quarterly Dutch administrative data from 1999-2008, we evaluate the
effect of an unexpected parental hospitalisation on (i) the probability of em-
ployment and (ii) conditional earnings over the subsequent 24 quarters. We link
records for working-age individuals to their parents’ health information and es-
timate an event study difference-in-differences model combined with coarsened55
exact matching and individual fixed effects. In subsample analyses, we check
for heterogeneous effects among individuals most likely to be caregivers based
on the residence of parents, number of siblings, alone living parents, alone living
children, employment status in the quarter before the parental shock and the
age of parents.60
A parental health shock can negatively affect the labour market involvement
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of the child in two ways: through informal care provision and through stress.
Providing care to a sick parent can be time intensive and energy demanding, and
caregivers may quit their jobs, reduce working hours and/or suffer from earnings
penalties. The relationship between informal caregiving and labour market65
outcomes has been studied extensively over the past two decades and either no
or a negative effect of caregiving on labour market outcomes was reported.1 For
example, Van Houtven et al. (2013) use the Health and Retirement Study with
an instrumental variable fixed effects model, using parental health and parental
death indicators as instruments. They find that there are no employment effects70
of informal caregiving for women, and small negative effects for men. At the
intensive margin, they find a reduction of 3-10 working hours per week with
a 3 percentage point wage reduction, but no effect for men. More relevant to
our setting, Ciccarelli and Van Soest (2018) provide recent evidence for Europe
and instrument informal caregiving with the death of a parent, poor health of a75
parent, and distance to the mother’s residence. They find that daily caregiving
significantly reduces the probability of being employed and the number of hours
of paid work, especially for females. On the other hand, providing care on a
weekly basis does not significantly affect paid work.
The second channel consists of the mental health effects that a parental hos-80
pitalization may inflict. Naturally, children worry about their parents if they
suffer from a severe illness or injury, which might lead to stress-induced health
issues that could in turn have adverse labour market consequences. The liter-
ature reports a positive association between parental and child health, which
persists when controlling for individual fixed effects and caregiving effects (Bo-85
1See Ciani (2012); Meng (2013); Van Houtven et al. (2013); Jacobs et al. (2016); Casado-
Mar´ın et al. (2011); Leigh (2010); Heitmueller (2007); Moscarola (2010); Heger (2014); Bolin
et al. (2008); Viitanen (2010); Schmitz and Westphal (2016); Heitmueller and Inglis (2007);
Carmichael et al. (2010); Michaud et al. (2010); Ettner (1996, 1995); Schneider et al. (2013);
Heger and Korfhage (2017); Geyer and Korfhage (2017); Løken et al. (2017); Crespo and Mira
(2014); Ciccarelli and Van Soest (2018). For a more extensive literature review see Bauer and
Sousa-Poza (2015); Lilly et al. (2007).
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binac et al., 2010; Amirkhanyan and Wolf, 2006, 2003), implying that there
is often a mental health effect induced by a parental health shock.2 Moreover,
Banerjee et al. (2017), among others, have documented a reduced labour market
involvement caused by bad mental health. On the other hand, the absence of
any of the links in the causal chain described will result in no effect of parental90
hospitalisation on labour market outcomes.3
Through one or both of these two channels, we expect either a negative or
no total effect of a parental health shock on children’s labour market outcomes.
Empirical evidence on the subject is sparse. Using Norwegian register data,
Fevang et al. (2012) find that employment and earnings of adult children decline95
prior to the death of a lone parent, especially for daughters. By limiting their
sample to individuals who lost a parent in the sample period, they do not have
a control group. We refine the approach of Fevang et al. (2012) in two ways.
First, we exploit unexpected parental hospitalisations, which cause a shock in
the demand for informal care for a larger share of the affected parents. This is100
arguably a more precise indicator of increased informal care demand than the
death of a parent. Second, we compare potential caregivers with individuals not
experiencing a parental health shock by choosing a control group that does not
differ significantly from the treatment group prior to treatment.
Three other studies have evaluated the labour market responses of spouses105
after a health shock of their partner. First, Garc´ıa-Go´mez et al. (2013) find that
an unexpected hospitalisation of a spouse in the Netherlands reduces employ-
ment by 1 percentage point, and earnings by 2.5% two years after the spousal
hospitalisation. Second, Jeon and Pohl (2017) examine labour market responses
2This is not a problem for our identification strategy, because we are interested in the total
effect of a parental health shock on labour market outcomes.
3Finally, a combination of the mental health and the informal caregiving channel is also
possible, where caregiving stress can impact the health of the caregiver, also leading to less
involvement in labour market activities. Negative health effects of informal caregiving have
been documented in various studies (Coe and Van Houtven, 2009; De Zwart et al., 2017; Bauer
and Sousa-Poza, 2015; Bom et al., 2019).
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after a cancer diagnosis of spouses in Canada and find a strong earnings and110
employment decline. Our study applies a similar methodology as Jeon and Pohl
(2017) to a broader population group and a wider range of adverse health events,
which implies a higher incidence of health shocks. Third, Fadlon and Nielsen
(2015) study the effect of health and mortality shocks on the labour market out-
comes of Danish spouses. They find that a spousal death leads to an increase115
in labour supply, especially for women, whereas non-fatal health shocks do not
affect the labour supply of the spouse. The identification strategy of Fadlon
and Nielsen (2015) relies on individuals with a future health shock as a control
group. Our study uses a more general control group based on the overall popu-
lation, while our findings barely change when using their identification strategy120
as a robustness test.
Our research complements these studies because we focus on the effects on
the labor market outcomes of adult children rather than spouses. As severe
health shocks occur mainly among the oldest old,4 the spouses of these patients
have often retired and labour market effects are most likely to occur among125
their children.
In addition, we offer the following contributions to the literature to date.
First, the quarterly frequency of observed outcomes in our data enables us to
test underlying assumptions, while still painting a fairly detailed picture of the
consequence of a parental health shock over 24 quarters. Second, our analysis is130
not affected by non-response or attrition bias as we include the entire population
of the Netherlands. Third, compared to the literature on labour market effects of
informal caregiving, our study can be interpreted as a reduced form set up which
avoids having to separate the effects of caring for and caring about (Bobinac
et al., 2010), which are difficult to disentangle and challenge the validity of using135
4Fadlon and Nielsen (2015) report that less than 12% of the households experiencing a
shock has two spouses younger than 60 (at which most Danes appeared to retire in that
period). In the other 88% of cases, the labor responses are mostly among the children. The
average age of the parent experiencing a shock in our data is 76 for mothers, and 78 for fathers.
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a parental health shock as an instrument for informal caregiving (Bom et al.,
2019). Moreover, unexpected parental hospitalisations are a more disaggregated
and precise instrument than previously used health shock proxies (e.g. Bolin
et al., 2008; Jacobs et al., 2016; Van Houtven et al., 2013). Fourth, our measure
does not suffer from any reporting biases compared to the common 5-point scale140
self-reported parental health indicator that is used in other studies (e.g. Ciani,
2012). Finally, we provide estimates for the entire population, not only a specific
at-risk caregiver subsample.
We find that in the Netherlands, an unexpected parental health shock does
not have any labour market effect, neither on employment probabilities nor on145
conditional earnings, neither for men, nor for women. Because of the large
study population, our result is very precisely estimated. Subgroup analyses
for at-risk caregivers and various robustness tests confirm the zero effect. A
complementary analysis of Dutch panel survey data shows that a health shock
of a relative leads to more informal care provision, but that this increase in150
caregiving does not lead to labour market effects. The mental health effect of
a health shock of a relative seems to be less important. Our finding suggests
that the LTC and labour market policies of the Dutch government facilitate
the combination of paid work and caregiving. Since the Dutch LTC system is
very generous, our findings can be reconciled with studies from other countries155
reporting labour market effects of less generous LTC system policy reforms (e.g.
Fu et al., 2017; Geyer and Korfhage, 2017).
2. Institutional Background
The Dutch formal LTC system is comprehensive and has a longstanding
tradition; a public LTC insurance (ABWZ5) was introduced in 1968 already. In160
the period of study (1999-2008), it covers all LTC in institutions and at home,
where care can consist of domestic help,6 social assistance, personal care, and
5Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten
6Transferred to the Social Support Act in 2007
7
Jo
rna
l P
re-
pro
f
nursing care (Mot, 2010; De Meijer et al., 2015). Given the broad coverage of the
public LTC insurance, private LTC is marginal and concentrated only among
the wealthy (Maarse and Jeurissen, 2016). Only between 0.3-1.0% of yearly165
household expenditure for LTC was for private LTC in 2001-2005 (Statistics
Netherlands, 2017b). An independent assessment agency grants access to LTC
depending on the physical and mental health status of the applicant, living
conditions, social environment, and informal care availability in the household
(Bakx et al., 2015a; CIZ, 2016). Other household members are expected to170
provide a ‘reasonable’ amount of informal care (Mot, 2010). Instead of using
the publicly provided LTC in kind, users can opt for a personal budget instead,
paying out 75% of the public care costs in cash to either purchase their care
on the market or pay their informal caregiver (Mot, 2010). Roughly 5% of the
elderly eligible for LTC chose a cash benefit in 2014 (CBS, 2017). Co-payments175
are low (making up 8% of total revenues) and income-dependent (Bakx et al.,
2015a).7
Informal caregiving is common in the Netherlands. Around 20% of the
Dutch adult population reported providing either intensive (more than 8 hours
per week) and/or prolonged (more than 3 months) spells of caregiving in 2008180
(de Boer and de Klerk, 2013). In the Study on Transitions in Employment,
Ability and Motivation (STREAM) survey, 13% of Dutch caregivers report to
provide more than 15 hours of care per week. On the demand side, Swinkels et al.
(2015) report based on a representative survey that 25.6% of 55+ respondents
used informal care in the Netherlands in 2001-2003. Around 60% of caregivers185
are female, and about half of them are aged 45-65. In 40 % of the cases, the care
7During the study period, some changes were introduced in the AWBZ. In the 1990s, there
were relatively long waiting times, and in 2001 there was a policy effort to shorten waiting
times through budgetary expansions. In an effort to curb rising LTC costs, higher co-payments
and regional budgets were introduced in 2004 and 2005 (Mot, 2010). In our analysis, these
changes may lead to different effects for different treatment cohorts. In a robustness check,
we shift the treatment period, but we do not find a different effects across cohorts. We are
therefore confident that these policy changes do not affect our results.
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recipient was a parent or a parent in-law. Women are more likely to provide
parental care, whereas men mostly provide spousal care (Oudijk et al., 2010).
Focusing on parental care, we would therefore expect to find a larger effect
for daughters than sons in this study. Caregiving tasks in the Netherlands190
consist most commonly of emotional support and supervision (90%), escort for
errands outside the home (90%), housework (84%), help with administrative
tasks (74%), followed by personal care (39%), and nursing care (37%). Extra-
residential care, where the care recipient does not live in the same household, is
provided for 21 hours per week on average (de Boer and de Klerk, 2013).195
The Dutch labour market is characterised by a high participation rate, and
one of the highest part-time employment rates among OECD countries (OECD,
2017c,a). Participation rates for the 35-65 age group were around 60% for both
men and women in 2003-2005 (Statistics Netherlands, 2017a), but around 40%
of the workers worked part-time, with large gender differences (15% for men200
and 80% for women). For men, half of the part-time employees worked 28-35
hours a week, whereas the majority of part-time working women did not work
more than 20 hours.
A recent report suggests that 26% of the 16-69 years old who work at least
12 hours per week combine paid and care work. 80% of these caregivers provide205
care on at least weekly basis; 20% intensively (at least 8 hours per week) (de Boer
et al., 2019), corresponding to around 400,000 individuals. These people work
on average 31 hours per week, and give around 21 hours of care. Most of this
care goes to parents (or parents in law). If the combination of care and paid
work is problematic, Dutch caregivers are entitled to care leave. Yet, in 2009210
this was not very popular: only 1% of employees took care leave in order to
care for a partner, child or parent (de Boer and de Klerk, 2013). One reason
for the limited popularity of care leave could be that it is unpaid when using it
for more than two weeks per year.
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3. Data215
The study population consists of the entire Dutch non-institutionalised pop-
ulation aged 35-65 between 1999 and 2008, with at least one parent still alive.8
We use quarterly data from Statistics Netherlands on demographics linked to
data on employment and earnings (1999-2011), hospitalisations (1995-2005),
residence coordinates, and the cause of death registry.9220
We use two labour market outcomes as dependent variables: the probability
of employment and earnings conditional on employment. Employment is spe-
cified as being employed at least one day in a quarter. The original tax data
contains yearly gross earnings after social security contributions per job con-
tract, and the beginning and the end date of a job. To get quarterly data, we225
compute daily earnings with the information on yearly earnings and contract
duration. We then multiply daily earnings with the number of days covered
by the contract in a given quarter. Lastly, we sum quarterly earnings per job
over all jobs held in a quarter. For the regression analysis, we use a logarithmic
transformation of conditional earnings.10230
The data available limits the type of work interruptions we can detect. Table
(1) shows possible labour market effects of a parental health shock, their legal
implications, and how we capture these with our data. Short and long-term care
leave, unpaid leave and sickness leave reduce earnings within the same contract,
similar to a reduction in the number of hours worked with the same employer.235
In this case, the effect of an earnings reduction is spread across a whole calendar
year. We will find a smaller, but still detectable, effect.11 We observe the full
8We drop all parents if they are 105 or older, since there seem to be some death registrations
missing. None of these parents have experienced a health shock in the sample period.
9Table A1 in the Appendix gives an overview of the data sets used.
10Lechner (2011) shows that if the outcome variable is log-normally distributed (and thus
the log of the outcome follows a normal distribution), the common trend assumption is viol-
ated when using levels instead of logs in a difference-in-differences setting. Inspection of the
distribution of the log of earnings shows that it is approximately normally distributed and
hence a log transformation is appropriate.
11This can be an issue for the common trend assumption. Inspection of pre-trends show
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Table 1: Potential labour market effects and how they are measured in our data
Status Legal situation In the data Event observed
Short-term care leave 2 weeks/y, paid at 70% Earnings ↓ Spread over 1 calendar year
Long-term care leave 6 weeks/y, unpaid Earnings ↓ Spread over 1 calendar year
Unpaid leave Individual agreement Earnings ↓ Spread over 1 calendar year
Sick leave Paid at 70%a Earnings ↓ Spread over 1 calendar year
Reduction in hours Same contract Earnings ↓ Spread over 1 calendar year
Reduction in hours New contract Earnings ↓ Next quarter
Change job New contract Earnings change Next quarter
Holidays 20+ days per yearb Not observed na
Unemployment No work contract Not employed Next quarter
Disability insurance No work contractc Not employed Next quarter
aUntil 2003, the first year of sickness is paid at 70% (but the payment has to be at least the sector-specific minimum
wage). From 2004 onward, sickness pay is extended to two years of sickness, also paid at 70%. This is the minimum;
most industry-level collective labour agreements entitle workers to 100% of the wage in the first year, and 70% in
the second. After two years of sick leave, one is transferred to the disability insurance.
b Exact rule for the minimum number: 4 times the days worked per week.
c DI can also manifest as a job change or a reduction in hours, depending on the degree of disability.
Source: Dutch Government (2001, 1996)
immediate reduction in earnings only when there is a new contract. We are not
able to observe if the individual takes up holidays, neither if the employer pays
full wages instead of the legal minimum required for care leave or sick leave.240
The main exposure variable of interest is an unexpected parental hospitalisa-
tion related to a new health problem. We limit the health shock to ICD-9CM12
diagnoses that are only treated in the hospital and that an expert physician
considered to be not foreseeable (see also Garc´ıa-Go´mez et al., 2015b, 2017).13
In addition, these hospitalisations are classified as a health shock only if the245
that it is no problem in our case.
12International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems
13The full list of included conditions is available as an online appendix.
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Table 2: The five most frequent parental health shocks
Diagnosis ICD9-CM Frequency %
Atrial fibrillation and flutter 427.3 18,273 7%
Transcervical fracture of neck of femur (closed) 820.0 11,090 4%
Angina pextoris; not elsewhere specified 413.9 10,492 4%
Intermediate coronary syndrom 411.1 10,295 4%
Cerebral artery occlusion; unspecified 434.9 9,633 3%
Sample selection: parents in the treatment group (see Section 4).
individual has not been hospitalised unexpectedly since 1995. This restriction
makes parents with and without a health shock more comparable before the
shock.
For our analysis, the parental health shock needs to be i) unexpected, ii)
severe and iii) causing an increase in the need for informal care. Since we only250
use first hospitalisations since 1995 (no hospitalisation in at least four years),
the hospitalisation can be viewed as plausibly exogenous variation in parental
health. Note that unexpectedness in our framework implies that in quarter q−1,
the hospitalisation in q is not foreseeable. It is thus not required that we only
include emergency room type of conditions. Some types of cancer, for example,255
are also included in our list of health shocks, because they require fast action
after detection, which will typically happen in the time frame of a quarter. First
time heart attacks are included too because, even though a heart attack could
be expected if a parent smokes and drinks a lot, the exact timing of the attack
cannot be anticipated.260
The unexpectedness of our health shock is tested in two ways. First, we
test the common trend assumption, which shows insignificant pre-trends in all
analyses. Second, we conduct a robustness test using a subset of nondeferrable
conditions that occur with the same frequency on weekends as on weekdays
(Card et al., 2009; Dobkin et al., 2018) (see Section 5.3 for more details). Since265
our list of health shocks covers a larger part of the population than the nonde-
ferrable conditions, we use the broader definition in our main analysis.
12
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The second condition, ii) severity, is a requirement for the health shock to
have an impact on the parent and his/her family members. Related to severity,
the shocks need to occur frequently enough to have an impact in a broad study270
population. For the 55+ population that had been hospitalised in 1999-2005,
37% was due to one of the conditions labelled as a health shock. In the first
quarter of 2001 alone, around 1.4% of all mothers (26,180 women) and 1.5% of
all fathers (23,161 men) were hospitalised due to such a health shock. The five
most frequent conditions by health shock classification are shown in Table 2.275
On a more aggregate level, Table 3 shows the frequency of grouped diagnoses
classified as health shocks in the treatment group.14 The most common shocks
are cancers, circulatory diseases, injuries, and strokes. Health shock admissions
are different from non-shock admissions in two ways. For the 55+ hospitalised
population in 1999-2005, they lead on average to a longer hospital stay: a280
health shock admission lasts on average for 8 nights, while a non-shock patient
stays ‘only’ for 5 nights. Moreover, health shocks are less likely to be day care
admissions (27 vs 73%).15 The severity of the health shocks is also reflected in
the difference in subsequent mortality. After a health shock, mothers (fathers)
are 7 (20) percentage points more likely to die before the second quarter of 2008285
if they had a health shock around 5-6 years before (significant at 1%) when
controlling for age, migration background, and living with a partner (see Table
A4 for details). Taken together, we interpret these statistics as evidence that
the diagnoses we use are indeed severe.
Third, the parental health shock has to be correlated with an increase in290
informal care demand. We use survey data for later years in the Netherlands
that contain both information about informal caregiving and an indicator that
‘a close family member (except for spouses) has a serious disease’ to support
this assumption. In this analysis (see Section 5.4), we find clear evidence that
14see Section 4 for how the treatment group is defined
15Tables (A2) and (A3) provide more information on the type of hospital diagnoses not
labelled as a health shock.
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Table 3: Parental health shocks by diagnosis group
ICD9 diagnosis group Frequency %
Cancers 66,322 24%
Circulatory diseases 61,586 22%
Injuries 53,611 19%
Strokes 34,256 12%
Respiratory diseases 14,539 5%
Diseases of the digestive system 12,749 5%
Diseases of the genitourinary system 12,500 4%
Diseases of the nervous system 11,096 4%
Musculoskeletal diseases 5,376 2%
Infectious diseases 4,292 2%
Skin diseases 1,993 1%
Endocrine diseases . .
Sample selection: parents in the treatment group (see Section 4).
Statistics Netherlands does not release data cells below 10 obser-
vations to protect privacy. Therefore, the numbers are missing for
the diagnosis group ‘endocrine diseases’.
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a health shock of a close family member is correlated with informal caregiving.295
This is backed up by two other types of evidence. First, other studies have
shown that diagnoses constituting a parental health shock are associated with
increased informal care use in the Netherlands (Van Exel et al., 2002) and
Spain (Garc´ıa-Go´mez et al., 2015a). Second, when combining the health shock
definition with information on health determinants of formal LTC use,16 we see300
that at least one third of patients aged 65+ hospitalised for the 23 most prevalent
admission diagnoses received formal home care after their hospitalisation (based
on Wong et al., 2010, see Table A5 in the Appendix for details). Furthermore,
combining diagnosis group-specifc information from Bakx et al. (2015c) with
the health shock definition shows that 32% of total LTC expenditures 3 years305
after a hospitalisation are caused by diagnoses we classify as health shocks.
To sum up, we feel confident that the parental health shock measure we use
indeed is unexpected, and has severe consequences that lead to LTC demand.
As time-variant control variables, we use the log of age, living with a partner,
and the number of children below 13. In the earnings equation, we add the310
number of jobs per quarter, and the tenure in the main17 job to proxy experience.
These covariates are used because they are likely to capture relevant time-variant
variation in employment and/or earnings and may be correlated with caregiving.
All the analyses are done separately by gender, as women are likely to react
stronger to a parental health shock than men due to gender norms.315
Table 4 and 5 show summary statistics of these variables.18 Our sample
consists of working individuals aged 47 years on average, whereas their parents
are in their seventies. Hence, our data includes old parents who potentially need
16Note that formal LTC use does not rule out the provision of informal caregiving. More
than half of informal caregivers in the Netherlands report to provide care in collaboration
with formal care services (De Klerk et al., 2017).
17The main job is defined as the job with the highest earnings if a person has more than
one.
18Table A6 and A7 in the Appendix show the same summary statistics for the working
sample.
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care, and working age individuals who could experience labour market effects
after a parental health shock.320
In addition to the main sample, we use eight subsamples for which either
informal caregiving is more prevalent and/or we expect a different effect than
for the overall population. First, we use a subsample of nearby living parents,
with children living in a 5km radius from their father and mother, since the
probability of providing informal care is decreasing in the distance to parents325
place of residence. Second, we condition on being employed one year before the
health shock. Having a stable job may discourage people from providing care,
which would result in a weaker effect than for the overall population. Third,
we look at individuals not employed one year before the parental health shock.
They may be more likely to provide care since they have no time constraints from330
a paid job. Fourth, we restrict the sample to parents aged 80 and older, whose
children are expected to face greater care demands compared to individuals
with younger parents. Fifth, we limit the sample to only children, so as to
exclude situations where care may be provided by siblings. Our sixth subsample
consists of alone living children, as they do not have a partner who could provide335
care instead. Seventh, we look at alone living parents, whose children face a
higher care demand as there is no partner who could provide care. Lastly, we
combine some of the above to only-children with alone and close-living parents,
which is the subgroup for which we expect the largest effect. If not indicated
differently, the subsamples are chosen on characteristics prevailing at the time340
of the parental health shock.
4. Empirical strategy
In order to evaluate the effect of a parental health shock on the probability
of employment and conditional earnings, we rely on a event study difference-
in-differences model over multiple treatment periods combined with coarsened345
exact matching (CEM) (Jeon and Pohl, 2017). Many studies about the labour
market effects of informal care provision thus far have concentrated on the imme-
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diate effect of caregiving. However, prior research taking a long-run perspective
has shown that cumulative effects over time are important (e.g. Schmitz and
Westphal, 2016; Skira, 2015; Michaud et al., 2010; Fevang et al., 2012; Viitanen,350
2010; Casado-Mar´ın et al., 2011; Moscarola, 2010). We therefore follow labour
market outcomes for 8 quarters before until 24 quarters after a health shock.
4.1. Selection of the treatment and control group
We start by excluding observations with an unexpected parental hospitalisa-
tion between 1995q1 and 2001q2 to make the sample more homogeneous. This355
avoids that relapses of pre-existing conditions play a role and thus reinforces the
unexpectedness of the parental health shock. Figure 1 depicts how the sample
is selected and how individuals are attributed to either the treatment (T) or the
control (C) group. The treatment group consists of individuals experiencing
a parental health shock between 2001q1 and 2002q2.19 This selection allows360
to test at least 8 quarters of pre-treatment trends in labour market outcomes
(employment and earnings are available since 1999). The treatment group is
separated in six cohorts according to the quarter of the shock. For each co-
hort, a corresponding control group is selected, consisting of people who did not
experience a parental health shock between 1995q1 and 2002q2.365
In order to link control individuals to a treated individual for each of six
treatment cohorts, every observation in the control group is duplicated six times
(Jeon and Pohl, 2017). For computational reasons, we then draw a random
subsample of controls.20 Individuals exit the sample at different points in time
if both parents die, upon reaching retirement age, or the death of the parent370
experiencing the health shock.21 Therefore, each cohort of treatment and control
19In a robustness check, we shift the treatment period to 2004q3-2005q4. The results remain
stable (Figure A13 in the Appendix).
20The study sample contains all treated and a clustered random sample of twice as many
control individuals. The unit of the clustering is the family, so that siblings are not separated.
In Section (5.3) we provide evidence that our results are not driven by this particular random
sample of controls.
2182% of the sample is observed for the full 33 quarters.
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Figure 1: Timing of the parental health shock and treatment (T) and control group (C)
assignment
T: 1st parental health shock
No parental health shock
C: No parental health shock
1995q1 - 2000q4 2001q1 - 2002q2
group is an unbalanced panel.
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Table 4: Women - summary statistics treatment and control group
Control Treatment
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean StdDiff StdDiff
Employed 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.57 -0.02 0.00
Employedq−4 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 -0.02 0.00
Employedq+24 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.59 -0.02 -0.02
Earnings 4,661 4,750 4,672 4,660 0.00 0.02
Earningsq−4 4,403 4,463 4,401 4,395 0.00 0.02
Earningsq+24 5,956 6,366 5993 6350 -0.01 0.00
Age 46.7 46.6 46.6 46.6 0.01 -0.01
Age mother 74.5 74.9 75.1 75.1 -0.05 -0.02
Age father 77.4 77.6 77.7 77.7 -0.03 -0.01
Living with a partner 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00
Dutch 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.93 -0.01 0.00
1st generation migrant 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00
2nd generation migrant 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00
Number of siblings 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.16 0.00
Number of kids <13 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.02 0.00
Father has partner 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.10 0.00
Mother has partner 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.10 0.00
Distance residence mother in km 25.9 26.4 28.1 27.9 -0.04 -0.02
Distance residence father in km 27.0 27.7 42.3 42.0 -0.22 -0.21
Number of jobs 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.00 0.00
Quarters employed in the main job 29.7 29.8 29.5 29.7 0.01 0.00
Distance to closest parent 24.3 24.5 23.4 23.4 0.02 0.02
One parent dead 0.32 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.31* 0.00
Age oldest parent 77.7 77.8 77.9 78.0 -0.02 -0.01
N 258,128 236,988 136,595 134,281
* StdDiff > 0.25 (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Standardised difference one quarter before the parental health shock
StdDiff=
X¯C,−1−X¯T,−1
(σˆ2
C,−1+σˆ
2
T,−1)0.5
where X¯C,−1 corresponds to the mean of variable X of the control group in the quarter
before the shock, and σˆ2 to the estimated variance. Earnings, the number of jobs and the tenure in the main job are
only considered for the employed.
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Table 5: Men - summary statistics treatment and control group
Control Treatment
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean StdDiff StdDiff
Employed 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.77 -0.02 0.00
Employedq−4 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 -0.02 0.00
Employedq+24 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.73 -0.03 -0.03
Earnings 9,720 9,869 9,825 9,774 -0.01 0.01
Earningsq−4 9,212 9,334 9,293 9,253 -0.01 0.01
Earningsq+24 12,171 12,466 12,453 12,539 -0.02 -0.00
Age 46.7 46.4 46.6 46.6 0.01 -0.02
Age mother 74.5 74.8 75.1 75.1 -0.05 -0.03
Age father 77.3 77.5 77.6 77.7 -0.03 -0.02
Living with a partner 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.00
Dutch 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 -0.02 0.00
1st generation migrant 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00
2nd generation migrant 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00
Number of siblings 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.16 0.00
Number of kids <13 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.00 0.00
Father has partner 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.11 0.00
Mother has partner 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.11 0.00
Distance residence mother in km 24.5 25.2 26.9 26.6 -0.04 -0.02
Distance residence father in km 25.5 26.9 40.9 40.7 -0.22 -0.20
Number of jobs 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.00 0.01
Quarters employed in the main job 43.0 43.0 42.9 43.1 0.00 0.00
Distance to closest parent 22.8 23.4 22.2 22.1 0.01 0.02
One parent dead 0.32 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.31* 0.00
Age oldest parent 77.6 77.7 77.9 77.9 -0.02 -0.02
N 269,635 246,117 141,727 139,289
* StdDiff > 0.25 (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Standardised difference one quarter before the parental health shock
StdDiff=
X¯C,−1−X¯T,−1
(σˆ2
C,−1+σˆ
2
T,−1)0.5
where X¯C,−1 corresponds to the mean of variable X of the control group in the quarter
before the shock, and σˆ2 to the estimated variance. Earnings, the number of jobs and the tenure in the main job are
only considered for the employed.
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4.2. Coarsened exact matching (CEM)
It is possible that individuals with a parental health shock are different from
the ones without a parental health shock. We therefore make the treatment and375
control groups more comparable on observables using coarsened exact matching
(CEM). CEM is an exact matching algorithm that splits the data into strata
according to all possible combinations of pre-imposed bins of observables. For
every stratum l, weights wl are calculated that balance the empirical distribution
of the matching variables between the treated and the controls.22 Individuals380
who cannot be matched receive weight zero.
We use CEM instead of propensity score matching since for a large data
set, the curse of dimensionality is less of a problem than for smaller survey
data sets while CEM has two main advantages over propensity score matching.
First, there is no need for ex-post balance checking as the maximal acceptable385
imbalance is decided beforehand by imposing the bins in which the observations
are matched. Moreover, the validity of CEM does not rely on a correct functional
form specification of the propensity score and never increases the imbalance
(King and Nielsen, 2016).
The main trade-off of CEM is between internal and external validity. On the390
one hand, the more bins, the more accurate the match will be and the higher
the internal validity. On the other hand, a greater number of bins decreases the
probability of finding a match for the treated, thus lowering external validity.
Our compromise to this trade-off is as follows. We use coarsening bins based on
the age of the oldest parent (cut-offs at 65,73,80,90), the number of siblings (cut-395
offs at 0,1,2, and 3), the number of kids below 13 (cut-off at 0), Dutch origin, an
indicator if one parent has passed away, and the minimum distance to mother
and father (cut-off at 5 and 50 km and missing23) one quarter before treatment.
22All treated individuals received wl = 1. Control individuals receive wl =
NC,totNT,l
NT,totNC,l
where
NC,tot is the total number of control individuals and NT,l the number of treated individuals
in strata l.
23The address data is missing for certain individuals for unknown reasons. In order not to
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Moreover, we add the pre-treatment mean over two years of employment (cut-
off at 0.2, 0.8, 1) and wage quintiles to match also on pre-treatment labour400
market attachment. We have 16’000 possible bins for each gender and lose 1-
2% of our treated individuals for whom no match could be found.24 Given that
the matched and unmatched results are fairly similar, we are confident that
this small loss of treated individuals does not affect the external validity of our
results.405
The effect of the CEM weighting on the pre-treatment summary statistics
can be seen in Tables 4 for women and 5 for men. The weighting does not affect
the difference between the means one period before the shock for the control
group (column 1 and 2) and the treatment group (column 3 and 4) very much.
Nonetheless, the weighting does bring treatment and control groups closer to410
one another. This is illustrated by column 5 and 6, where the standardised dif-
ferences in the means between treatment and control group are shown. Imbens
and Wooldridge (2009) suggests the rule of thumb that a standardised differ-
ence should be below 0.25 to ensure that the linear regression methods are not
sensitive to the model specification. In our unweighted sample, the standardised415
differences in means are all well below 0.25, except for the indicator whether one
parent has died, which is 0.31 for both men and women. This is addressed in the
weighted sample, where the standardised difference for this variable is close to 0
for both genders. The similarity between the weighted and unweighted sample
gives additional support for the exogeneity of our parental health shock.420
4.3. Difference in differences
We use a difference-in-differences model to follow every cohort of treated
and controls over time and average this effect over the six cohorts (Jeon and
lose the observations with missing distance measure, ’missing’ is added as a coarsened category
to this variable
24For women, 2589 bins contain at least one observation, out of which 846 bins containing
treated women that could not be matched. These unmachted treated bins contain around 2.7
women on average (as opposed to 51.9 treated women per matched bin on average).
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Pohl, 2017; Hijzen et al., 2010). We define an indicator of how many quarters an
individual is away from a health shock qkit with k ∈ [−8, 24] with zero indicating
the quarter in which the shock occurs. For the control group, this variable
is coded according to the corresponding treated individuals in the attached
treatment cohort. The treatment group is designated by Di.
yit = αi + αt +
24∑
k=−7
γkqkit +
24∑
k=−7
βkDiq
k
it + δxit + εit (1)
Equation (1) is estimated using the within transformation plus CEM weighted
least squares for the probability of employment and log conditional earnings.
The first sum in Equation (1) captures the common time trends of treatment
and control before and after the health shock. The second sum is the difference425
in difference term, with coefficients of interest β0, ...β24. The reference period
is eight quarters before the shock (q = −8). In addition, quarterly time fixed
effects αt, individual fixed effects αi, time-varying controls xit and the error
term εit are included in the model. We cluster the error term on sibling level
because they are affected by the same parental health shock (Abadie et al.,430
2017).25
The identifying assumption of a difference-in-differences approach is the com-
mon trend assumption, implying that the treatment and control group would
have had the same trend had the treatment not occurred. A violation of the
assumption could occur if a parent suffering from a chronic illness in t is more435
likely to experience a health shock in the future t+m. Therefore, if the health
shock is a symptom for overall health deterioration, the underlying parental
health distributions may not be the same for the treatment and the control
group. This could imply that the informal care demand and thus labour sup-
ply evolves differently for the treatment and the control group over time.440
Directly testing for the evolution of parental health is not possible (cf.
Garc´ıa-Go´mez et al., 2013; Fadlon and Nielsen, 2015), but the inspection of
raw employment and earnings trends by group before the health shock is in-
25Our conclusions are robust to clustering the standard errors at individual level.
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Figure 2: CEM weighted employment and earnings trends
formative. Figure 2 depicts the CEM-weighted employment proportions and
conditional earnings median trends in the 8 quarters before and 24 quarters445
after the parental health shock. The main conclusion is that the pre-trends are
similar between treatment and control group. Weighted on pre-treatment char-
acteristics but not controlling for covariates, the treated are more likely to work
after the parental hospitalisation; and this difference is statistically significant
at 1% after 24 quarters. This is somewhat surprising, as we would have expected450
that the treated are less likely to work after a parental health shock. Yet, when
looking at standardised differences (see Table 4 and 5, line 3), the treatment
and the control group seem to be balanced in employment (and earnings) 24
quarters after the parental health shock. In earnings, there does not seem to
be a difference in the treatment and the control group after the parental health455
shock.
More formally, potential pre-treatment differences in trends can be detected
through t-tests for significance of β−7, ...β−1. If pre-treatment indicators are
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not significant, underlying differences in parental health between the groups are
unlikely, and hence the parental health shock is indeed unexpected. Further-460
more, we conduct a robustness test where we restrict the population to parents
without any hospitalisation, thereby forcing common parental health trends to
the extent possible with our data.
5. Results
5.1. CEM weighted Difference-in-Difference465
Figure 3: Earnings and employment effects of a parental health shock
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
In Figure 3, we plot the CEM weighted coefficients of the difference-in-
differences term βk and their 95% Bonferroni adjusted26 confidence interval for
26We always report Bonferroni adjusted statistical significance, since we conduct simultan-
eous t-tests (Armstrong, 2014) and would therefore expect some significant results due to
25
Jo
urn
al 
Pre
-pr
oo
f
the probability of employment and conditional log earnings by gender. The leads
of the parental health shock are not significant in any of the specifications. The
common trend assumption thus seems reasonable.470
The main result from the difference-in-differences analyses is that a parental
hospitalisation does not have any effect on short run or long-run labour market
outcomes for men and women. Given the confidence intervals, we can rule
out with 95% confidence a negative employment effect outside the range of [-
1.0,0.6] percentage point for women, and [-0.6;1.4] percentage point for men. For475
earnings, the corresponding intervals are [-1.8;1.1] percentage point for women,
and [-1.0;1.0] percentage point for men. This means that, even if the estimated
effect was significant, it would be extremely small and thus it would not be
regarded as economically significant. This also holds for male employment. It
seems that towards the end, the estimated effect becomes positive and nearly480
significant - but the estimated effect is only 0.8 percentage point. The no-effect
finding is consistent over multiple at-risk caregiver subsamples (as explained in
the next subsection) and other robustness checks.
The Bonferroni correction does not come at a price in terms of power. For
an F-test that all difference-in-differences terms are jointly equal to zero with485
a Bonferroni adjusted significance level at 5% and given our sample size, the
power of the F-test is at least 83% for both genders and labour market outcomes
(Cohen, 1988). Hence, our results are indeed a precisely estimated zero effect
and not due to a lack of power.27
chance. The Bonferroni correction adjusts our significance levels as following: Significance at
10% needs a p-value below 0.0031, 5% 0.0016 and for 1% 0.0003 respectively.
27Given these high level for power, we are well protected against type II error. Leamer
(1978) argues that type I error should be minimised as well by setting the significance level as
a decreasing function of sample size. We have considered applying this principle with guidance
from Kim (2015). Since the Leamer adjustment would result in a very low (practically zero)
level of the significance threshold for some specifications, we do not use it for our results. If
we implemented it, this would result in even stronger evidence for no effect.
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Table 6: Subsamples with the highest caregiving probability
Main results Parents living
close
Employed at t-1 Not employed at
t-1
Parents aged 80
and older
Only children Single children Single parent Only-child with
single parent
living close-by
k Women employment
-4 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011)
8 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.030
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.025)
N 10,472,312 3,785,132 5,664,304 4,074,596 2,358,443 1,332,005 9,421,949 4,761,327 155,356
k Women earnings
-4 0.001 0.003 0.002 n.a. -0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.007 -0.021
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.028)
8 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.100 -0.011 -0.014 -0.002 -0.011 -0.042
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.122) (0.019) (0.017) (0.007) (0.012) (0.041)
N 5,535,660 2,068,478 5,266,047 20,059 893,359 687,325 4,933,449 2,247,920 76,536
k Men employment
-4 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.008
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
8 -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.012 -0.002 -0.005 -0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.019)
N 10,887,124 4,280,767 8,346,671 2,068,191 2,432,290 1,399,697 9,531,344 4,956,231 163,135
k Men earnings
-4 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 n.a. 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.013
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.025)
8 -0.001 -0.007 -0.000 0.157 -0.004 0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.118) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.041)
N 7,973,127 3,191,206 7,840,758 18,250 1,535,933 990,626 6,973,002 3,431,813 116,391
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple testing. Difference-in-differences coefficients for k quarters away from the shock and their standard error
in parenthesis. For the subgroup who are not employed, k = −4 is not applicable, as nobody has a wage 4 quarters before the health shock in this subsample. A more detailed
definition of the subsamples can be found in Section (3).
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5.2. Subgroups with the highest caregiving probability490
The population of the Netherlands might contain too many individuals who
would never provide care (or too many parents who do not need it) to detect an
effect. Therefore, we conduct the same analysis for subsamples with individu-
als who are most likely to become caregivers or for whom we expect a larger
effect. First, we look at parents living close by. The closer the parents live, the495
more likely caregiving becomes. Distance to parents has also been used as an
instrument for informal caregiving (e.g. Jacobs et al., 2016). Second, we analyse
children who are employed one year before the parental health shock. In this
group, we would expect a larger effect since they are more time-constrained than
children who were initially not working.28 On the other hand, we would expect500
children who are not employed to be more likely to take on a caregiving task.
Therefore, the third group consists of children not employed one year before the
shock. Fourth, it may be that the parents we are looking at are not frail enough
so that their health shock does not have labour market consequences for the chil-
dren. We therefore look at parents aged 80 and above. Fifth, caregiving tasks505
could also be taken over by siblings or spouse of the parent. For this reason,
we look at the subgroup of only-children, and children of alone-living parents.
Finally, we construct a combination of the above with only-children with alone
but close-living parents. If there is an effect, it would be in this group, since
there are no siblings nor a partner who can take over the caregiving task, and510
since the parent lives close caregiving is even more likely.
Table 6 gives an overview of these results by showing the coefficient of the
difference-in-differences term one year before the parental hospitalisation (as an
indication for common trends, k = −4) and the coefficient of two years after the
parental hospitalisation (k = 8) for both the main results and these subsamples.515
A graphical representation of the full results is displayed in Figures A1-A8 in the
Appendix. We do not find a significant effect for any of these at-risk caregiving
28Ideally, we would want to have in this group only people who are full-time employed, but
unfortunately this information is not available in our data.
28
Jo
u
l P
re-
pro
of
Table 7: Robustness checks
Main results No CEM Future health
shock
Shift treat-
ment
Severe health
shock
Nondeferrable
health shock
No hospital-
isations
k Women employment
-4 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.006 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002)
8 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007* 0.007 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004)
N 10,472,312 11,163,541 10,562,227 7,967,087 7,718,097 5,167,069 7,989,373
k Women earnings
-4 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.040 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.022) (0.004)
8 -0.003 0.006 -0.002 0.009 -0.008 0.022 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.030) (0.007)
N 5,535,660 6,328,643 5,969,159 4,652,946 3,996,809 2,979,330 4,183,222
k Men employment
-4 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.018 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002)
8 -0.000 0.004 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004)
N 10,887,124 11,644,517 11,020,382 9,126,660 8,065,470 5,298,997 8,303,397
k Men earnings
-4 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002)
8 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.021 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.021) (0.004)
N 7,973,127 8,667,909 8,420,805 6,770,736 5,876,284 4,391,123 6,054,516
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple testing. Difference-in-differences coefficients for k
quarters away from the shock and their standard errors in parenthesis are displayed. (1) Main results: baseline results using
CEM weighting for comparison. (2) No CEM: baseline results not using weights. (3) Future health shock: Control group only
includes individuals with a future health shock. Based on the population and not on a random sample. (4) Shift treatment:
Treatment period shifted to 2004q3-2005q4. (5) Severe health shock: Subset of health shocks with more than 6 hospital nights.
(6) Nondeferrable health shock: Subset of health shocks that happen as frequently on weekends as on weekdays. (7) No
hospitalisations: No parental hospitalisation from 1995q1-2001q1.
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subgroups, not even for the only children with alone but close living parents.
Even though we lose some precision in smaller subsamples, the power of the
smallest subsample, the only children with a single parent who lives close-by, is520
still 99% thanks to our large administrative data set. Hence, these null-results
are not due to a lack of power either. Given these subsample results, we are
confident that the zero effect we found in the main analysis is not due to the
broad sample.
5.3. Robustness checks525
We check the robustness of our main findings in Table 7. Again, the coef-
ficient of the difference-in-differences term one year before the parental hospit-
alisation (as an indication for common trends, k = −4) and the coefficient of
two years after the parental hospitalisation (k = 8) are reported in the Table,
whereas complete graphical evidence can be found in the Appendix (Figure A9-530
A14). The first column shows the main results for ease of comparison. The first
robustness check shows that the CEM weighting (column ‘No CEM’) does not
drive our results.
In the column ‘future health shock’, we limit the potential effect of a par-
ental health shock on labour market outcomes to 10-15 quarters depending on535
the cohort of the shock. This enables us to choose as a control group only the
individuals who experienced a parental health shock in 2005, in the spirit of
Fadlon and Nielsen (2015).29 This should make the control group more com-
parable to the treated and thus increase the internal validity. The downside
of this approach is a decrease in external validity, since we are not looking at540
the population as a whole anymore. We find a borderline significant, very small
employment effect for women, which is never larger than 0.76 percentage points,
and the confidence interval never includes an effect larger than -1.1 percentage
29Concentrating only on individuals with a future parental health shock as controls reduces
the study population considerably. This enables us to conduct the analysis on the whole study
population instead of all treated individuals and a random subsample of controls, resulting in
a slightly higher number of observations than in the main specification.
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points. These are extremely small effects, which we do not consider econom-
ically significant. In terms of the effect size, the findings are comparable to545
the main specification, but there is more precision since we are looking at a
more homogeneous group. For men in general, and for female earnings, the null
results of the main specification are confirmed.
Furthermore, we check if our selection of the treatment period affects our
results by redefining the treatment group as individuals with a parental health550
shock in 2004q3-2005q4 (‘Shift treatment’). There is no effect of a parental
hospitalisation on labour market outcomes in this different treatment group.30
In two further checks, we use a stricter the definition of a parental health
shock. In the column ‘severe health shock’, we only include individuals with
parents who stay in the hospital longer than 6 nights, which is the median555
length of stay. Length-of-stay might be a proxy for very severe cases, which
in turn require a lot of informal care. The results show that this subset of
hospitalisations do not have labour market effects for their children either. In the
column ‘nondeferrable health shock’, we restrict the parental health shocks to
a narrower set of diagnoses for which the patients are hospitalised as frequently560
during the weekend as during the weekdays (see Card et al., 2009; Dobkin
et al., 2018).31 This implies that these conditions are nondeferrable. While this
definition ensures unexpectedness, we do not use it in our main specification
because it excludes many diagnoses that can be considered a health shock in
the sense that they cannot be foreseen in q− 1. For the subset of nondeferrable565
parental health shocks, we do not find different results than with the full set of
parental health shock.
In the column ‘No hospitalisations’, we limit our sample to individuals with
no parental hospitalisation in the period 1995q1-2000q4, be it unexpected or
30This also shows that the minor LTC policy changes in the study period are not influencing
our results.
31By ICD9 diagnosis, we test if the proportion of weekend admissions is equal to 2
7
= 0.29.
If we do not reject H0, the diagnosis is defined as nondeferrable.
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any other potentially foreseeable hospitalisation. This is the furthest we can570
go in order to force common parental health trends with the data available.
With this stricter selection criterion, the sample is considerably reduced, since
parental hospitalisations are a frequent phenomenon. The results are again very
similar to our main results, providing further evidence that potential remaining
differences in underlying parental health between treatment and control group575
do not influence our results.
Finally, we verify whether the random sample of controls that we draw leads
to similar result as with other random samples. We have conducted the main
analysis for women’s employment also on 99 other clustered random subsamples
of controls. The treatment effects are never jointly significant, whereas the pre-580
treatment effects are jointly significant 1632 times out of a 100. All pre-treatment
and post-treatment coefficients contain zero between the 2.5th and 97.5th per-
centile of their distribution as illustrated by Figure A15 in the Appendix. We
are therefore confident that our results are not sensitive to the random sample
we have selected.585
In sum, these robustness tests confirm that our main finding of no effect of a
parental health shock on the labour market outcomes of their children is robust
to a series of additional tests.
5.4. The role of informal care and mental health
A parental health shock can negatively affect the labour market outcomes of590
the child in through informal care provision and through stress.33 We explore
whether these two are affected by a health shock to explore what might explain
32We would expect significant results by chance only 5 times out of 100 random samples.
However, when looking at effect size, the coefficients are on average -0.0005, and the largest
coefficient is 0.006 in absolute value. This means that even if pre-trend effects are jointly
significant, they are extremely small. Moreover, none of the coefficients are individually
significant at 10%. We are therefore not concerned about the too high occurrence of joint
significance of pre-trends in our random samples.
33These two might be interrelated as informal care may have a negative effect on the care-
giver’s mental health (Bom et al., 2019)
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our results and to increase the external and internal validity of our findings. To
this end, we use the Study on Transitions in Employment, Ability and Motiv-
ation (STREAM), a Dutch yearly panel data set covering the years 2010-2013.595
While it does not cover the whole Dutch population (there are 40,063 individual
- year observations), this data set is useful since it contains information about
employment, a serious disease of a close family member (excluding spouses) or
friend in the past 12 months,34 informal caregiving, and mental health. There-
fore, we can reproduce our analysis using a similar set up, and additionally600
we can shed light on the channels - i.e. does a parental health shock not lead
to informal caregiving/mental health decline, or does the take up of informal
care/mental health decline just not translate into a labour market effect?
As an indicator for mental illness, we use a depression score (CES-D-10,
range [0;30] where a higher score indicates more depressive symptoms) and a605
mental component summary scale (MCS12, range [0;100], where a higher score
indicates better mental health). More information about these two measures
can be found in (Bom et al., 2019).
Descriptive statistics show that 38% of the people experiencing a serious
health event in the family are informal caregivers. Among all informal care-610
givers, 62% are employed. In terms of mental health, people with a serious
health event in the family have on average a 0.6 point higher depression score,
and report a 1.2 points worse overall mental health. Given the range and the
mean of these two measures, these differences are very small. The employed are
on average in better mental health.615
We conduct two type of analyses for both the informal care and the mental
health channel. First, we regress the variables for informal caregiving and the
mental health measure on the onset of a serious health event of a close family
member individual fixed effects and a set of control variables: log of age, living
34This does not exactly coincide with the definition of a parental health shock used in the
rest of the paper. However, the basic ingredients are there nevertheless. Parents are close
family members, and the onset of a serious disease carries the notion of unexpectedness.
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with a partner, the financial situation of the household in five categories, and620
year. Others might consider using - or might have used - such a set up as
the first stage regression in an instrumental variable analysis, but we refrain
from this because we are not convinced that a serious illness of a parent is a
valid instrument for informal caregiving: both the exclusion restriction and the
monotonicity assumption might not be met. The mental health channel, and the625
fact that one cares about the care recipient mean that the exclusion restriction
(Bom et al., 2019) is likely violated (and the other way around for mental
health). Moreover, showing whether there is a strong relationship between a
parental health shock and informal caregiving and a such a health shock and
mental health problems is the most important to understand the main results630
of our study and this regression suffices for that.
The results (colum 1-6 of Table 8) show that the illness of a close family
member is a strong predictor of informal caregiving for both the overall and the
working sample, and the effects are large. A serious health event in the family
seems to slightly increase depressive symptoms (if at all), and seems to reduce635
overall mental health. The coefficients are (mostly) statistically significant, but
the effect size is very small given the range of the indicators and not economically
significant. This suggests that informal caregiving may be the most affected (if
we ignore interaction effects between informal caregiving and mental health).
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Table 8: The effect of a health shock on informal caregiving and mental health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Dep. variable IC IC CES-D-10 CES-D-10 MCS12 MCS12 LMO LMO
Employment (All)
Serious health event 0.0740*** 0.0663*** 0.104 0.218*** -0.454*** -0.311** -0.00616 -0.00283
(0.00793) (0.00679) (0.0810) (0.0747) (0.158) (0.146) (0.00802) (0.00665)
Observations 18,648 21,415 18,648 21,415 18,648 21,415 18,648 21,415
Working hours (Working population)
Serious health event 0.0881*** 0.0646*** 0.0740 0.237*** -0.552*** -0.586*** -0.0848 0.0951
(0.0108) (0.00814) (0.107) (0.0865) (0.210) (0.171) (0.138) (0.121)
Observations 10,469 15,460 10,469 15,460 10,469 15,460 10,469 15,460
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables: IC = provides any informal care; CES-D-10 =
depression score with range [0;30] where zero indicates no depressive symptoms; MCS12 = mental component summary scale with range
[0;100] where 100 indicates good mental health; LMO = labour market outcomes employment (top) or working hours (bottom). Control
variables (ln age, living with a partner, the financial situation of the household in five categories, year and individual fixed effects) are not
shown but included in the regressions.
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In a second step, we reproduce a reduced-form model similar to the one640
estimated in the rest of the paper, where an indicator for illness of a close
family member is regressed on employment and working hours while controlling
for the log of age, living with a partner, the financial situation of the household
in five categories, year and individual fixed effects. The results are displayed in
column (7) and (8). As in the main analysis, we find that an illness of a close645
family member does not affect employment nor working hours for both genders.
These supplementary analyses are informative in three ways. First, the first
analysis shows that a serious health event is related to informal caregiving in the
Netherlands, while the second shows that such an event does not have labour
market consequences. It is thus likely, that our no-effect finding in the main650
analysis is due to a no-effect of informal caregiving on labour market outcomes,
but not because a parental health shock is unrelated to informal caregiving.
Second, it reproduces the main analysis of this study for a different time period
and a different sample, thus increasing the external validity of our results. Third,
it provides suggestive evidence that informal caregiving may be a more common655
response to a health shock of a relative than a mental health decline.
6. Conclusion and discussion
Health shocks occur frequently and may not only have a severe and lasting
effect on the labour market status of the patients, but also on the labour supply
decisions of their working-age family members because they may care for - and660
care about - the patient. As these health shocks are most frequent in old age,
labor supply effects may be the most frequent for their middle-aged children,
who are an important source of informal caregiving. These labour market effects
are undesirable if they cause unavoidable financial uncertainty for the caregivers.
Our study exploits unexpected parental hospitalisations to evaluate their665
effect on the probability of employment and conditional earnings of adult chil-
dren. While these health shocks cannot capture all care needs, especially not
those related to slowly deteriorating chronic conditions like e.g. dementia, they
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are frequent and correlated with formal and informal LTC use and thus relev-
ant. We estimate an event study difference-in-differences model over multiple670
treatment cohorts and combine it with coarsened exact matching. The main
findings show that there is no effect of such a health shock on the probability
of employment and conditional earnings. The analysis of subsamples such as
for example only children with an alone and close living parent, for whom we
expected the effects to be larger, do not show any effects either. In some spe-675
cifications, we find borderline significant effects, but the point estimates are too
small to be economically significant. Given the large sample size, these results
are very precisely estimated and are not due to lack of power. Various robust-
ness tests confirm our findings. Exploring potential explanations, we find that
unexpected parental health shocks lead to informal caregiving, but do not affect680
mental health. Therefore, our zero result is likely to be due to the absence of
an effect of informal care on labour market outcomes, and not due to lack of
correlation of a parental health shock and informal caregiving.
This interpretation of our results is also in line with a recent report on
caregiving and working in the Netherlands. (de Boer et al., 2019) study working685
caregivers, among which 73% indicate that paid and care work can be combined.
25% of caregivers report that they accomodate their tasks by taking holidays.
Only 10 % takes paid leave, and still fewer take unpaid leave (6%) or report sick
(4%). Around one-third of the caregivers provide care on working days, whereas
the two thirds do this on off-days/weekends. Hence, most caregivers seem to690
find ways to combine their paid job with caregiving tasks. Other prior studies
combining data from the Netherlands with data from other European countries
indeed do not find earnings (Bolin et al., 2008) or employment effects either
(Meng, 2013; Viitanen, 2010; Moscarola, 2010; Josten and De Boer, 2015). The
results then suggest that Dutch caregivers do not face a trade-off between paid695
work and care responsibilities. One explanation for this finding may be that
the Dutch formal long-term care system largely meets care needs and is readily
accessed thanks to low co-payments and low waiting times (Bakx et al., 2015a),
which means that the demand for intensive informal care is short-lived or low
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and thus may be met by the child while having a paid job.35700
What do our findings mean in a broader context? The Dutch are able to
continue working even if their elderly parents need care after a hospitalisation.
We interpret this as a sign that the comprehensive-yet-expensive public LTC
insurance scheme in the Netherlands protects children against the risk of having
to give up one’s job to care for a sick parent. This interpretation is in line with705
a study for Norway, where the LTC system is also generous, and expansion of
formal home care in 1998 had no effect on long-run employment or earnings for
only-child daughters (Løken et al., 2017). Other recent studies do underscore
the fact that the labour market - caregiving trade-off does arise in systems that
are not as generous as the Dutch. This can be illustrated for example by a710
comparison to Japan, which only spends 2.2% of its GDP on LTC, versus 3.7%
in the Netherlands (OECD, 2017b). Fu et al. (2017) find that the introduction
of LTC insurance in Japan in 2000 did have positive spill-over effects on labour
market outcomes of informal caregivers, whereas a reduction of generosity of
the insurance in 2006 had a negative effect.715
In addition to the generous LTC system, 40 percent of the 35-65 years old
work part-time in the Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 2017a). Part-time
workers have more time available outside their paid job that can be dedicated to
caregiving tasks. This has two consequences. On the one hand, this may reduce
the effect of caregiving on labour market outcomes. On the other hand, this may720
lead to sorting of part-time workers into informal caregiving. Our results show
that these part-time workers do not adapt their degree of part-time work after a
parental health shock, since we do not find earning effects. Descriptive statistics
show patterns that are consistent with sorting behaviour (de Boer et al., 2019):
non-caregivers work on average 35 hours per week, caregivers 33, and intensive725
caregivers 31.
35The onset of formal care does not imply that informal caregiving stops, however. More
than half of the Dutch informal caregivers who provide care to someone outside of their own
household does so together with at least one formal caregiver (De Klerk et al., 2017).
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Overall, our findings strongly indicate that in general, a trade-off between
paid and care work may exist but that it may be weakened substantially by
the design of the LTC system and labour market institutions. In the Neth-
erlands, where the LTC system is generous and comprehensive and part-time730
work widespread, the trade-off appears to have vanished at least for care in-
duced by parental health shocks, and the duties of caregiving and paid work
can be reconciled, leading us to conclude that Dutch adult kids are alright.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Data975
Table A1: Data sets
Data set Version Content
PARTNERBUS V1 2015 Partner identification
GBAPERSOONTAB V1 2015 Basic personal data
Do V1 1995-2005 & 2009-2011 , V2 2006-2008 Death register
GBAADRESOBJECTBUS V1 2017 Address register
VSLGWBTAB V1 2018 Address municipality codes
KINDEROUDERTAB V2 2015 Children parent linkages
LMR Basis V2 1999-2004, V3 2005 Hospital admissions
BAANKENMERKENBUS V3 1999-2006 & 2008-2011, V2 2007 Employment
BAANSOMMENTAB V3 1999-2005, V2 2006-2011 Earnings
STREAM n.a. Survey data
Information about the data sets can be found at https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/
onze-diensten/maatwerk-en-microdata/microdata-zelf-onderzoek-doen/
catalogus-microdata (available in Dutch only).
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Table A2: Frequencies of main diagnosis groups for hospitalisations not classified as a health
shock among the 55+ hospitalised population in 1999-2005
ICD9 diagnosis group Frequency %
Diseases of the nervous system 1.178.845 16%
Musculoskeletal diseases 1.045.818 15%
Circulatory diseases 1.001.110 14%
External causes of injury and supplemental classification 874.510 12%
Symptoms, signs, and ill-defined conditions 793.792 11%
Diseases of the digestive system 680.621 10%
Diseases of the genitourinary system 429.479 6%
Respiratory diseases 314.601 4%
Cancers 249.338 3%
Endocrine diseases 205.375 3%
Blood diseases 187.252 3%
Mental disorders 87.165 1%
Skin diseases 86.307 1%
Infectious diseases 17.465 0%
Congenital diseases 8.910 0%
Pregnancy related 18 0%
Conditions originating in the perinatal period 13 0%
Table A3: 5 most frequent diagnoses not defined as health shocks among the 55+ hospitalised
population in 1999-2005
Diagnosis ICD9-CM code Frequency %
Senile cataract 366.1 537.414 8%
Unspecified cataract 366.9 319.584 4%
Osteoarthrosis, localized 715.3 252.466 4%
Coronary atherosclerosis 414.0 234.215 3%
Chest pain 786.5 177.516 2%
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Table A4: Linear probability model for parent’s mortality in 2008q2 after a health shock
(1) (2)
Mortality mother Mortality father
Unexpected hospitalisation 0.0676*** 0.199***
(0.000486) (0.000685)
First generation migrant 0.0785*** 0.0770**
(0.000653) (0.000778)
Second generation migrant 0.00808*** -0.00362***
(0.000611) (0.000691)
Birth year -0.0223*** -0.0233***
(1.53e-05) (1.72e-05)
Partnered 0.0862** 0.0804***
(0.000236) (0.000304)
Constant 2.524*** 2.559***
(0.00171 (0.00186)
Observations 2,828,507 2,738,722
R-squared 0.517 0.466
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5: LTC use after hospitalisation for health shocks patients among the 23 most common
diagnoses of Dutch Hospital Patients aged 65+ in 2004
Condition % of
sample
Formal
care %
Home
care %
Home for the
elderly %
Nursing
home
%
Lung cancer 1,1 54,2 50,1 1,3 2,9
Ovary cancer 0,2 51,9 47,3 1,9 2,7
Intestinal, stomach
and rectum cancer
2,2 50,2 46,1 1,6 2,6
Uterus cancer 0,3 34,9 32 1,7 1,2
Fracture of femur 1,7 53,8 29,9 5,5 18,4
Fracture of ankle of
lower leg
0,4 42,4 26,7 4,8 10,9
Fracture of elbow and
forearm
0,5 32,1 24,4 2,5 5,1
Bladder cancer 1 25,8 23,9 0,6 1,3
Prostate cancer 1,3 22,9 20,2 0,8 2
Cerebrovascular dis-
ease
3,6 38,5 17,9 1,4 19,2
Intracranial injury 0,6 27,1 17,4 2,2 7,5
Source: Wong et al. (2010)
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Table A6: Women wage summary statistics
Control Treatment Control Treatment
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean StdDiff Diff
Age 45.1 45.2 45.2 45.2 -0.02 -0.01
Age mother 73.2 73.7 74.0 74.0 -0.07 -0.03
Age father 75.8 76.3 76.5 76.6 -0.06 -0.02
Living with a partner 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.00
Dutch 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.93 -0.01 0.00
1st generation migrant 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01
2nd generation migrant 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01
Number of siblings 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.7 0.14 0.00
Number of kids <13 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.02 0.00
Father has partner 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 -0.09 0.00
Mother has partner 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.08 0.00
Distance residence mother in km 26.2 26.7 28.3 28.1 -0.03 -0.02
Distance residence father in km 27.0 27.8 39.7 39.4 -0.19 -0.17
Number of jobs 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.00 0.00
Quarters employed in the main job 29.7 29.8 29.5 29.7 0.01 0.00
Distance to closest parent 24.9 25.0 24.0 24.0 0.02 0.02
One parent dead 0.29 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.28* 0.00
Age oldest parent 76.2 76.6 76.8 76.8 -0.06 -0.02
N 142,970 132,927 77,366 76,164
* StdDiff > 0.25 (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Standardised difference one quarter before the parental health
shock StdDiff=
X¯C,−1−X¯T,−1
(σˆ2C,−1+σˆ
2
T,−1)
0.5 where X¯C,−1 corresponds to the mean of variable X of the control group in the
quarter before the shock, and σˆ2 to the estimated variance.
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Table A7: Men wage summary statistics
Control Treatment Control Treatment
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean StdDiff StdDiff
Age 45.8 45.8 45.9 46.0 -0.01 -0.02
Age mother 73.9 74.3 74.6 74.6 -0.06 -0.03
Age father 76.6 76.9 77.1 77.1 -0.05 -0.02
Living with a partner 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.00
Dutch 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.93 -0.02 0.00
1st generation migrant 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00
2nd generation migrant 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00
Number of siblings 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.7 0.15 0.00
Number of kids <13 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.01 0.00
Father has partner 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.10 0.00
Mother has partner 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.10 0.00
Distance residence mother in km 24.4 25.1 26.7 26.5 -0.04 -0.02
Distance residence father in km 25.3 26.3 39.6 39.4 -0.21 -0.19
Number of jobs 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.00 0.01
Quarters employed in the main job 43.0 43.0 42.9 43.1 0.00 0.00
Distance to closest parent 22.9 23.4 22.3 22.3 0.01 0.02
One parent dead 0.30 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.30* 0.00
Age oldest parent 76.9 77.2 77.4 77.4 -0.04 -0.02
N 204,680 189,933 109,130 107,848
* StdDiff > 0.25 (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Standardised difference one period before the parental health
shock StdDiff=
X¯C,−1−X¯T,−1
(σˆ2C,−1+σˆ
2
T,−1)
0.5 where X¯C,−1 corresponds to the mean of variable X of the control group in the
shock before the shock, and σˆ2 to the estimated variance.
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Figure A1: Parents living in a 5km radius
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
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Figure A2: Employed 1 year before the shock
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
Figure A3: Not employed 1 year before the shock
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
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Figure A4: Parents aged 80+
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
Figure A5: Only children
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
56
Jo
urn
al 
P e
-pr
oo
f
Figure A6: Alone living children
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
Figure A7: Alone living parents
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
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Figure A8: Only children with single close living parent
Figure A9: Unweighted
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
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Figure A10: Control group with future health shock
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
Figure A11: Shift treatment period to 2004q3 - 2004q4
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
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Figure A12: Severe health shocks
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
Figure A13: Nondeferrable health shocks
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
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Figure A14: Drop all parental hospitalisations between 1995q1-2000q4
The grey shaded areas correspond to the Bonferroni adjusted 95% confidence intervales.
Figure A15: 2.5 to 97.5 interpercentile range of βk from 100 different random control group
samples (Women employment)
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